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Federal courts have increasingly suggested that class actions can be too
big. But how should courts restrict class size? To date, courts have relied upon several provisions within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23—principally the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality prerequisite and the
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Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and superiority requirements—to deny
certification to massive class actions. These tools are regulatory in nature: without stating as much, courts set maxima on class size, and classes crossing that line are rejected as too large. The result is a binary
certify-or-not proposition. But regulation comes at a price. Precision
cost-benefit analysis is both resource-intensive and exceedingly difficult.
Thus, wary of class counsels’ incentives, courts are more likely to systematically underestimate optimal class size. And, even if courts achieve
precision balancing, denying certification to sub-optimally large classes
entails denying relief to a multitude of positive-utility plaintiffs—a classic deadweight loss.
Fortunately, regulation is not the only way. Rule 23 contains a handful
of latent tax mechanisms—from Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s notice requirement
to Rule 23(h)’s provisions on attorney’s fees—that can also restrict class
size. For example, courts using their broad discretion to set attorney’s
fees under Rule 23(h) can impose a progressive fee structure that
awards class counsel less for each marginal class member or group of
class members. Like Pigouvian taxes, these hidden Rule 23 taxes allow
courts to restrict class size by bending self-interested counsels’ marginal
cost and benefit curves without denying certification to the class writ
large. And, like the Pigouvian alternative to regulation generally, taxing
class size promises important advantages: it avoids the deadweight loss
that accompanies regulatory decision-making, it is information-forcing,
and it is “revenue generating” from the perspective of absent class
members.
This Article makes three contributions to class action scholarship. First,
it introduces a novel regulation-versus-taxation framework, revealing
several heretofore-unexamined tax mechanisms within Rule 23. Second,
it explores how the Pigouvian alternative yields welfare-enhancing advantages relative to regulation-by-certification. Finally, it considers how
this approach to managing class size might impact quickly evolving areas of doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Inverting the notion of “too big to fail,”1 many courts have decided
that class actions be too big to certify.2 Size matters in this context
because big classes, particularly those brought under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3),3 can be difficult to manage and give rise to
the “fatal dissimilarit[ies]” amongst unnamed plaintiffs that militate
against certification.4 Fortunately, Rule 23 expressly trains its sights
on these problems: Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement polices
manageability,5 while Rule 23(a)’s commonality prerequisite6 and
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement guard class cohesion.7 In
short, Rule 23 appears to anticipate the problems size can create.
But to some courts, size is a problem in and of itself. The Fifth Circuit has warned that, because multi-million member classes “dramati1. “Too big to fail” refers to the notion that certain large financial institutions and related
entities must be protected from insolvency because they are so interconnected to the economy
that their failure would portend significant economic distress. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 231 n.239 (2008).
2. Compare In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying class
certification via mandamus in part because certification of the putative class seeking billions of
dollars in damages would put the defendants “under intense pressure to settle”), with Klay v.
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Mere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit.”). For
discussion of whether a class can be too big to certify, see, for example, Alexandra D. Lahav,
The Curse of Bigness and the Optimal Size of Class Actions, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 117, 118
(2010) (“Are some classes so big that they must fail? Some argue that there is so much at stake
for the plaintiffs and the defendants that the class ought not to be certified. If courts refuse to
certify classes based on size, either formally or by more stringent application of procedural requirements, then big class actions will fail. Or perhaps big class actions must fall apart because of
their own weight; such a large group of plaintiffs can never be sufficiently homogenous to sustain
class treatment.”).
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). This Article concerns only Rule 23(b)(3) and so-called damages
class actions. So-called “injunction class actions,” brought under Rule 23(b)(2), generally do not
present a similar size. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The nature of an injunction typically does not
vary whether a putative class contains 100 or 100,000 members. And while Rule 23(b)(2) classes
can also seek damages, they cannot be certified under that provision if that “monetary relief is
not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief” sought. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 360 (2011).
4. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016) (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 107 (2009)).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 82 (2d Cir.
2015) (“While Rule 23(b)(3) sets out four individual factors for courts to consider [for the superiority inquiry], manageability is, by the far, the most critical concern in determining whether a
class action is a superior means of adjudication.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carnegie
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A class action has to be unwieldy
indeed before it can be pronounced an inferior alternative.”).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)
(predominance “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication
by representation”).
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cally affect[ ] the stakes for defendants . . . certification of mass tort
litigation classes has been disfavored.”8 More directly, the Third Circuit has stated that “the size of the class and number of claims . . . is a
factor we weigh in our certification calculus.”9 And while other courts
have been coy, size often looms in the background.10 The Eleventh
Circuit opined that, “[i]n cases where the defendants’ potential liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm
suffered by the plaintiff, we are likely to find that individual suits,
rather than a single class action, are the superior method of adjudication.”11 Further, nearly every federal court of appeals permits interlocutory review of a certification order that would sound a “death
knell” on the litigation by pressuring the defendants to settle.12 In
other words, class actions are more likely to attract appellate scrutiny
if—and merely because—they are big.
The concern is not misplaced. Even ostensibly certifiable class actions—those without manageability concerns and comprised of unquestionably cohesive members—can yield negative externalities.
Massive classes typically seek astronomical damages, bringing potentially unbearable settlement pressure upon defendants, which risks
over-deterring net-beneficial activities.13 And, owing in part to their
8. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
9. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001).
10. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It may
be that the aggregation in a class action of large numbers of statutory damages claims potentially
distorts the purpose of both statutory damages and class actions.”); In re Trans Union Corp.
Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 350–51 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“approval of a class action could result in
statutory minimum damages of over $19 billion, which is grossly disproportionate to any actual
damage”); Griffin v. GK Intelligent Sys., Inc., 196 F.R.D. 298, 305 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (“The Court
also concludes that a class action is not the superior procedure for this securities fraud lawsuit
because class certification skews trial outcomes and creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting London v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003)).
12. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294 (1st Cir. 2000);
Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001);
Newton, 259 F.3d at 162–63 (3d Cir. 2001); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 145 (4th
Cir. 2001); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999); Chamberlan v.
Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2005); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1263
(10th Cir. 2009); Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Lorazepam &
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
13. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2000) (“the defendant [will
be] bludgeoned into settling [class claims] for more than they are worth” because “class counsel
is able to threaten the defendant with a costly and risky trial”); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2003). But see In re
Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001), superseded by statute
on other grounds, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (amended 2003), as recognized in Mazzei v. Money
Store, 829 F.3d 260, 267 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The effect of certification on parties’ leverage in
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size, these classes can be difficult to monitor, raising the specter of
agency costs.14 Nothing in Rule 23, however, expressly directs courts
to monitor whether a class is too big.15
And yet courts routinely lament class size.16 The class action canon
is replete with case law warning against certifying big classes, particularly in light of blackmail settlements and agency costs.17 Lacking express textual authorization to tackle the “curse of bigness,”18 courts
make do with the tools available. To date, that has entailed tightening
the screws on certification by restricting what it means for an issue to
be common, for a common issue to predominate, and for a class action
to be superior to litigation alternatives.19 Courts frequently trace the
increasingly unforgiving doctrines that animate these textual hooks to

settlement negotiations is a fact of life for class action litigants. While the sheer size of the class
in this case may enhance this effect, this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.”).
14. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
agency costs “often can be far more severe in the class action context, primarily because classes
tend to be large, dispersed and disorganized and therefore suffer from a collective action dilemma not faced by individual litigants,” which contributes to “significantly less monitoring of
the attorney by the class and consequential[ly] higher agency costs”).
15. Many courts, however, address blackmail settlements and agency costs as issues related to
superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:81 (“Occasionally,
courts will deny class certification on superiority grounds because of the financial consequences
of certification.”).
16. See supra notes 8–10.
17. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011) (“We are presented with
one of the most expansive class actions ever. The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the certification of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs . . .”);
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The class members are
interested in relief for the class but the lawyers are interested in their fees, and the class members’ stakes in the litigation are too small to motivate them to supervise the lawyers in an effort
to make sure that the lawyers will act in their best interests.”); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although finding the hydraulic
pressure to settle should not dispositively affect a certification decision . . . it should be balanced
against the benefits of a class action.”); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir.
1996) (“In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure
on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not.”).
18. See generally Lahav, supra note 2.
19. See infra Part I.B; see also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 729, 773, 799 (2013) (describing a “heightened scrutiny of commonality” following the
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, and an elevated predominance inquiry after the Court’s decision
in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013)).
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class size,20 and, where courts are less direct, observant commentators
fill in the gaps.21
All of this is an unspoken exercise in regulation. Courts establish a
rough numerical threshold above which class size is unreasonable. To
attain certification, class actions must fit under the limit, which (ideally) represents the point at which the social costs of certification outweigh the benefits. The same process—setting a numerical threshold
for the output of a certain product that is (ideally) keyed to cost-benefit analysis and regulating accordingly—is commonplace in the administrative state. Consider, for example, regulations governing the
release of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastic emissions.22 PVC is socially useful—it is lightweight, flexible, and durable; manufacturers
use it to make products that carry water, deliver medicine, and transfer credit through slim cards that fit in our pockets. But PVC emissions are carcinogenic. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has therefore decided that above certain production thresholds the
negative externality of air pollution outweighs the social benefits of
production; it therefore caps vinyl chloride emissions through various
regulatory tools.23
20. See, e.g., Comcast, 569 U.S. at 38 (“The permutations involving four theories of liability
and 2 million subscribers located in 16 counties are nearly endless. In light of the model’s inability to bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra-competitive
prices attributable to the deterrence of overbuilding, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating
subscribers within the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class.”); In re New Motor
Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The plaintiffs might
intend to use their damages model to prove both fact of damages and the measure of those
damages. If so, the district court would need enough information to evaluate preliminarily
whether the proposed model will be able to establish, without need for individual determinations
for the many millions of potential class members, which consumers were impacted by the alleged
antitrust violation and which were not.”); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prod. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 351 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Viewing these variations in the context of a case involving five state-law causes of action, the laws of fifty states, and over twenty-three millions
plaintiffs, the court must conclude that this suit cannot be practically and efficiently tried as a
class action because plaintiffs have not established a predominance of common legal issues as
required by Rule 23(b)(3).”).
21. See Lahav, supra note 2, at 118 (“Many opponents of the decision to certify the [WalMart] class present their arguments as a function of size.”); William H.J. Hubbard, Optimal Class
Size, Dukes, and the Funny Thing About Shady Grove, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 693, 693 (2013)
(“Can a class be too big to be certified? This question lurks in the background of Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, given that the class as certified by the district court was composed of
approximately 1.5 million members.”).
22. See, e.g., Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 787 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (discussing an EPA rule that regulates the emission of hazardous air pollutants during
the production of polyvinyl chloride, a “versatile” plastic “used in everything from water pipes to
credit cards,” the production of which “results in the emission of more than a dozen known or
suspected carcinogens”).
23. Id. at 550.
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Courts similarly cap class size because, at some point, the negative
externalities of certification outweigh the accompanying social benefits. But in policing bigness, courts are no more limited to regulation
than the government. Just as the federal government can eschew regulations and instead impose tax emissions,24 so too can courts tax class
size. In making that case, this Article does not dispute whether courts
should restrict class size, or even whether class size in fact generates
negative externalities that often outweigh the social benefits of certification. Rather, it takes courts’ observed preference for smaller classes
as a starting point, and from there explores the optimal process for
how to best restrict class size.
As already discussed, Rule 23 contains latent regulatory mechanisms. It also houses a number of heretofore-unexplored taxes. For
example, Rule 23(h) provides that “the court may award reasonable
attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by
the parties’ agreement.”25 This amorphous fee provision affords
courts concerned with bigness the discretion to impose a progressive
tax on class counsels’ fees—entitling counsel to less for each marginal
class member. This, in turn, combats counsels’ incentive to boost class
size by decreasing the marginal benefit of each incremental class
member from counsels’ perspective. Similarly, courts facing massive
classes might deploy a heightened version of the comparably malleable Rule 23(c)(2) notice requirement26—perhaps by requiring greater
response rates or additional proof of receipt as class size grows—to
increase the marginal cost of the incremental class member from
counsels’ perspective. The court can use these and other taxes to conform counsels’ preferences to its own assessment of optimal class size.
This Article contends that these taxes are often superior to regulation: both approaches restrict class size, but taxing class size does so
while better avoiding collateral damage, namely the deadweight loss
that accompanies denying certification to the class writ large. To make
this argument, Part I presents a model for conceptualizing optimal
class size and, importantly, the marginal costs and benefits that result
from including the incremental member in a class action. This model
builds upon existing class action scholarship in order to illustrate the
24. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 95
(2015) (“A Pigouvian tax is a tax equal to the harm that the firm imposes on third parties. For
example, if a manufacturer pollutes, and the pollution causes a harm of $100 per unit of pollution to people who live in the area, then the firm should pay a tax of $100 per unit of pollution.
This ensures that the manufacturer pollutes only if the value of the pollution-generating activities exceeds the harm, such that the social value of those activities is positive.”).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (concerning attorneys’ fees).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (concerning class notice).
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choices class counsel faces when deciding whether to include an additional plaintiff in a class, as well as the decisions courts must make
when reviewing the prudence of counsels’ choices. Having established
this framework, Part I shows how courts tame bigness by regulating
class size.
Part II presents the taxation alternative. In particular, it canvasses
Rule 23’s latent tax mechanisms, which fall into two categories: some
increase the marginal cost of class size, while others decrease the marginal benefit of class size (in both cases from counsels’ perspective).
Then, relying on the framework set forth in Part I, this Part demonstrates the efficacy of both types of taxes in restricting class size. Part
II concludes with the affirmative case for taxing class size: first, compared to regulation-by-certification, taxation avoids the deadweight
loss of denying certification to thousands or even millions of net-beneficial class members; second, taxation is information-forcing, allowing
courts to precision-calibrate class size with fewer resources; and third,
from the perspective of absent class members, taxation is revenuegenerating, enabling certification to act as a force multiplier that better realizes the aims of the class device.
Finally, Parts III and IV are forward-looking. The former outlines
obstacles and objections to taxing class size and explains how courts
might navigate around them. The latter discusses some of the doctrinal consequences that might follow from taxing class size. Most obviously, courts concerned with class size—but unconcerned by a
putative class’s cohesiveness—should certify and tax. That, in turn,
suggests a loosening of prevailing doctrinal standards that govern
commonality and predominance in particular.
I. OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE
Class size comes at a cost, but not all costs are not evenly distributed amongst the key players. The asymmetric allocation of costs and
benefits explains much of the tug-of-war between counsel and courts
over optimal class size. Self-interested attorneys typically prefer bigger classes—each incremental class member carries marginal costs,
such as the cost of notice or litigating individualized defenses, but also
promises additional settlement leverage and fees. Courts tend to prefer smaller classes—each incremental class member promises the marginal benefit of greater deterrence, but also risks over-deterrence and
additional administrative burden. This decoupling of private and social cost-benefit analyses causes counsel to propose classes that courts
often deem too big to certify. Courts regulate accordingly.
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In making these points, this Part proceeds in three moves: First,
Section I.A establishes a model for conceptualizing class size. This
framework illustrates the aforementioned decoupling of private and
social costs and benefits. Second, Section I.B maps the courts’ command-and-control response to this decoupling. Specifically, this Section describes how some courts have used contemporary
commonality, predominance, and superiority doctrines to regulate
bigness where the social costs of class size outweigh the social benefits. Third, Section I.C argues that this regulation is not itself costless.
As in any field of administration, regulation carries its own costs and
benefits. And even in the best case, regulating class size—which entails denying certification to overpopulated classes—risks costly
under-deterrence and administrative errors.
A. Modeling Class Size
1. Conceptualizing Class Size: Private Costs and Benefits
The model begins with an uncontroversial assumption: attorneys
build class actions.27 The composition of a class therefore reflects
counsels’ self-interested cost-benefit analysis. When building a class,
counsel must make numerous decisions—not least among them, how
to define the class, which determines class size.28 For example, a class
might include all customers allegedly injured by a defective product
before July 1, 2017, or before July 1, 2018; an antitrust class action
might include only direct purchasers, or also downstream customers; a
securities class action could include all shareholders who purchased
stock between September 1 and September 6, or September 1 and October 6; a mass-tort class might include claimants from just one state,
or from several. Each of these decisions, big and small, affect class
size.
27. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why
“Exit” Works Better Than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 411 (2008) (“the plaintiff’s attorney can behave less as an agent serving a principal and more as an independent entrepreneur,
one who in fact often hired the client”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
885 (1987) (“[T]he most basic characteristic of a market is lacking within the context of entrepreneurial litigation because the buyer does not shop for legal services. Rather than the ‘principal’ hiring the ‘agent,’ the reverse often occurs with the attorney finding the client after the
attorney first researches and prepares the action.”).
28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 296–97 (2010) (“in the typical class action in the United States, a plaintiffs’
attorney will file a complaint that may broadly define the class to consist of thousands of persons
and entities, without the attorney having the prior consent of more than the attorney’s individual
client”).
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Rational class counsel will define the class to include every claimant
for whom the marginal benefit of inclusion outweigh the marginal
cost. From counsels’ perspective, the marginal benefit of the incremental class member is counsels’ fee from (or attributable to) that
claimant. Costs are more complicated. Excluded are certain fixed costs
that do not vary with class size—for example, the costs of litigating
common issues or filing a complaint. Whether a class alleging violations of antitrust law contains 100 or 100,000 members, the cost of
proving the existence of a conspiracy will not vary significantly; nor
will the filing fee charged by the court.29 Other costs, however, vary
with class size—for instance, the cost of litigating an individualized
defense or issuing notice to a remote and hard-to-locate plaintiff.
These are marginal costs.
The model next assumes that rational class counsel will—if armed
with perfect information—seek to include plaintiffs with higher associated marginal benefits and lower associated marginal costs before including lower-value claimants. This can be represented graphically by
arraying potential class members along a spectrum beginning with
those carrying the highest marginal benefits and lowest marginal costs,
proceeding to those with dwindling marginal benefits and escalating
marginal costs.30 From counsels’ perspective, ideal class members
have significant damages, present minimal individualized defenses,
and are easy to locate. Counsel must then decide whether to add incremental class members to this high-value core:

29. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)
(existence of antitrust conspiracy is common across the class); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig.,
73 F.R.D. 322, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (“[P]rice-fixing conspiracy cases, by their nature, deal with
common legal and factual questions about the existence, scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy.”); see also 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1781 (3d ed. 2014) (“whether a conspiracy exists is a common question”).
30. The ensuing discussion borrows from Professor Hubbard’s excellent essay, Optimal Class
Size, Dukes, and the Funny Thing About Shady Grove, which explains: “One can therefore array
the potential class members in the order that they would be added to a class. When searching for
claimants to form a class, one would initially choose to add those claimants with the highest
marginal benefits and lowest marginal costs.” Hubbard, supra note 21, at 697. Professor Hubbard’s model builds upon one developed by Professors David Betson and Jay Tidmarsh in Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH L. REV. 542 (2011),
from which the ensuing discussion also borrows.
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FIGURE 1: Marginal Private Costs and Benefits of Class Size

In Figure 1, the marginal cost curve increases because, as mentioned, counsel will build the class around highly similar, readily identifiable plaintiffs who risk minimal individualized defenses.31 Each
incremental class member carries greater litigation costs, notice costs,
and so forth. Meanwhile, the marginal benefit curve decreases because counsel will simultaneously build the class around plaintiffs with
significant damages claims—and thus fees—relative to anticipated litigation costs. Counsel will cease adding to the class at point N, where,
from counsel’s perspective, the marginal cost of the incremental class
member outweighs that individual’s anticipated marginal benefit.32
31. There is, surprisingly, a dispute in the optimal-class-size literature over whether marginal
costs increase or decrease. Contrary to conventional economic wisdom, Betson and Tidmarsh
“assume that the marginal cost of adding new class members is generally falling.” Betson &
Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 551. They explain: “A principal component of the cost of litigating
the action is the cost of the initial discovery, which is the same whether the case involves one or
N plaintiffs. Although costs might increase somewhat as the size of the class increases . . . economies of scale are likely to offset these increases.” Id. at 552. Hubbard, by contrast, argues that
“[o]nce fixed costs are separate from marginal costs, we should expect that the marginal cost
associated with adding additional plaintiffs should rise (or at least not fall) as the size of the class
increases.” Hubbard, supra note 21, at 698 n.19. Professor Hubbard is correct. What Professors
Betson and Tidmarsh identify as declining marginal costs are in fact declining average total costs,
a calculus that includes the fixed costs of initial filing, discovery, and so forth.
32. See Betson & Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 554 (“Once we have created a group of size X, a
class should continue to add members as long as the benefit of adding another class member
exceeds the cost of doing so . . . . It should stop adding class members once the cost of adding
another class member exceeds the benefit from doing so . . . .”).
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Certainly, marginal benefit does not always decrease. For class actions alleging statutory damages in particular, marginal benefit does
not vary:
FIGURE 2: Marginal Private Costs and Benefits of Class Size
(Statutory Damages)

But, as Figure 2 illustrates, the outcome is the same: counsel will add
to the class until the marginal cost of the incremental class member
outweighs that individual’s marginal benefit—again, all from counsels’
perspective (i.e., balancing fees against litigation costs). The intersection of these curves, N, is counsels’ optimal class size.
2. The Courts’ View: Social Costs and Benefits
Where attorneys build, courts review. And the judiciary balances
markedly different costs and benefits than counsel.33 In particular,
courts weigh the social costs and benefits of certification, many of
which are, like their private cousins, marginal and vary with class size.
33. Some courts construe the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority requirement as a pseudo cost-benefit
analysis requirement. See, e.g., Singleton v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 78, 86 (2010) (“The court
essentially conducts a cost-benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members
likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re
Netbank, Inc., Sec. Litig., 259 F.R.D. 656, 667 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“The key to certification of a
class under Rule 23(b)(3) is whether the efficiency and economy of class adjudication outweighs
the difficulties and complexity of individual adjudication.”).
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Before turning to those social costs and benefits, note that the ensuing
discussion excludes from consideration the amount that class members (and their counsel) might recover from defendants. These recoveries do not represent a social cost or benefit; they are a wealth
transfer between private parties.34 Other costs and benefits, however,
are shared by society writ large.
a. Marginal Social Benefits
The principal social benefit of class size is deterrence.35 Incremental
claimants add damages to the aggregate claim, making it more likely
that defendants will internalize the full social costs of their behavior.36
Assuming the accuracy of the underlying cost-benefit analysis, this is
to society’s benefit. For example, absent regulation, a PVC factory
that pollutes the air at a social cost of 2x in order to realize a private
gain of x will cease its welfare-reducing behavior only if it faces liability equal to or greater than x. The larger a class of injured plaintiffs—
perhaps individuals who inhaled polluted air and developed some
sickness or other injury—the greater the probability that the factory
faces liability at or beyond x. That, in turn, benefits members of society who lack a sufficient claim, but who are affected by the factory’s
negative externalities.
Each class member’s contribution to this social good varies. The deterrent effect of the 1000th class member is not equal to that of the
2,000th class member. Returning to the PVC factory, optimal deterrence depends upon forming a class with expected damages that equal
or exceed x. Deterrence is thus achieved by a class that attains damages of x or x+1. Beyond that point, each marginal class member
dwindles in deterrent value. Although a would-be wrongdoer is perhaps more likely to restrain itself as prospective class size swells from
10,000 to 10,001, it is even more likely to restrain itself as prospective
34. Although one could argue that retributivism carries an inherent social benefit, such a benefit—could it be measured—would be is closer to a fixed benefit that does not vary by class
member. Cf. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006) (discussing this view of the class device and arguing that “[a]ll that matters is whether the practice causes
the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions”).
35. See id. at 139 (arguing that “the primary goal in small-claims class actions is deterrence,
and that the only question we should ask with respect to any rule or reform proposal in this area
is whether it promotes or optimizes deterrence”); RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 626–27 (5th ed. 1998) (“the most important point [of a class action] from an economic
standpoint is that the violator be confronted with the costs of his violation—this achieves the
allocative purpose of the suit—not that he pays them to his victims”).
36. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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class size swells from 1 to 10,000. In other words, incremental class
members afford declining deterrent weight:
FIGURE 3: Marginal Social Benefits of Class Size

Missing from this deterrence-centric analysis are administrative benefits. In addition to deterrence, class actions yield certain judicial efficiencies.37 As class actions aggregate more and more claims into a
single proceeding, courts avoid the costs of overseeing a multitude of
individual trials. That, in turn, frees courts to administer justice in unrelated cases more expeditiously. But this docket-clearing social benefit also declines with each incremental class member. Recall that
rational counsel includes high-value claims in its class before lowvalue claims. As a result, each incremental claim is less likely than the
one before it to be economically viable absent certification.38 Society
37. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (noting that the “class-action device
saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting
[many parties] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23”); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 307 (1973) (“Class actions were born of necessity. The alternatives were joinder of
the entire class, or redundant litigation of the common issues. The cost to the litigants and the
drain on the resources of the judiciary resulting from either alternative would have been
intolerable.”).
38. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 565, 570 n.19 (2013) (“In a negative-value—or large-scale, small-claim—case, the costs of
individual litigation for a plaintiff exceed the value of the claim, essentially making the claim
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does not realize judicial-efficiency gains by aggregating claims that
would be too small to clog courts on their own.
b. Marginal Social Costs
Class actions also generate negative externalities on society writ
large. A review of the case law shows that courts frequently consider
three marginal social costs attendant to class size: over-deterrence,
agency costs, and administrative costs—each reviewed in detail in the
pages that follow. As was the case with counsels’ cost curve, each of
these social costs increases with the incremental class member.
First, large class actions risk over-deterrence.39 As classes grow, defendants are more likely to settle unmeritorious claims to avoid ruinous liability.40 Such in terrorem settlements can be welfare-reducing:
settlement pressure unmoored from the merits deters would-be defendants from engaging in welfare-enhancing or net-beneficial behavior that risks inviting such pressure in the first instance.41 For example,
the PVC factory might decline to pollute at a social cost of x to generate 5x in wealth if it would face a class claiming 10x in damages. But
society would be better off by allowing the factory to generate 5x, and
then taxing it x or x+1 to cover cleanup and other remedial costs. Eschewing this first-best solution yields over-deterrence. Certainly,
would-be defendants are properly deterred if the risk of meritorious
claims influences their actions. Society is better off when these actors
worthless. Class actions, which aggregate many such claims, can make the case financially worthwhile.”); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, What the Shutts Opt-Out Right Is and What It
Ought to Be, 74 UMKC L. REV. 729, 743 (2006) (“In ‘negative-value,’ small-claims damages class
actions, class members rarely opt out because litigating individually would be economically
irrational.”).
39. See Noah Smith-Drelich, Curing the Mass Tort Settlement Malaise, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1,
19 (2014) (“[O]ver-deterrence will result if plaintiffs are permitted to craft classes that include
unlike claims, compelling defendants (who lose) to pay for the claims of class members whom
they may not have wronged.”).
40. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Judge Friendly,
who was not given to hyperbole, called settlements induced by a small probability of an immense
judgment in a class action ‘blackmail settlements.’ ”); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784–85 (3d Cir. 1995) (vacating a certification order
and observing that “class actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a
greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly
to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess of the individual claims’ actual worth”).
41. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167–68 & n.8 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has also recognized the dynamic pressure certification sets in
motion. The Court has observed that certification of a large class may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to
settle and to abandon a meritorious defense. Certifying this class raises a similar concern because
the size of the class and number of claims may place acute and unwarranted pressure on defendants to settle.”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)).
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internalize the costs they would owe as damages in individual litigation. But would-be defendants that are compelled to act or not to act
in a certain manner owing to the risk of unmeritorious claims can become sub-optimally over-deterred.
This social cost increases with each incremental class member. Recall that counsel—acting rationally—includes strong and meritorious
claims in its class before claims that are more difficult and costly to
prove. In other words, each incremental class member is less likely to
hold a meritorious claim against the defendant than the one before it.
Yet, at the same time, each incremental class member also increases
aggregate damages.42 Thus, incremental class members simultaneously
reduce the overall merit of the class and increase its aggregate damages—the twin components of over-deterrence.
Second, agency costs increase with class size.43 As a class grows,
counsel can devote less time to each individual claimant, group of
plaintiffs, theory of the case, and so forth. At the same time, growth
makes it more difficult for any single plaintiff to monitor class counsels’ conduct and representation of the class.44 Indeed, incremental
class members are incentivized to free ride on each other’s monitoring
capabilities.45 These factors together foster principal-agent problems.
And those problems represent a greater social ill than a mere wealth
transfer from the class to counsel. In particular, as a class sprawls and
counsel becomes more difficult to monitor, it becomes easier for defendants to negotiate collusive settlements.46 This other side of the
42. Although, as previously mentioned, not evenly so.
43. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 446
(3d Cir. 2016) (“A primary concern about class action settlements is that unmonitored class
counsel may have incentives to sell out the class’s interests in return for a large fee.” (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 745
(7th Cir. 2008) (“The judge who presides over the class action and must approve any settlement
is charged with responsibility for preventing the class lawyers from selling out the class, but it is a
responsibility difficult to discharge when the judge confronts a phalanx of colluding counsel.”).
44. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
agency costs “often can be far more severe in the class action context, primarily because classes
tend to be large, dispersed and disorganized and therefore suffer from a collective action dilemma not faced by individual litigants,” which contributes to “significantly less monitoring of
the attorney by the class and consequential[ly] higher agency costs”).
45. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1636 (2008) (“The lawyer acts as a faithless agent when she pursues
her own interests at the expense of her client’s. This is a particular problem in class action litigation because there are so many putative principals . . . . This sometimes results in, for example,
class counsel negotiating low settlements in exchange for defendants’ payment of relatively high
attorneys’ fees.”).
46. See Thorogood, 627 F.3d at 294 (“The defendant wants to minimize outflow of expenditures and the class counsel wants to increase inflow of attorneys’ fees. Both can achieve their
goals if they collude to sacrifice the interests of the class.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
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blackmail-settlement coin—sweetheart settlements—can also harm
society writ large by selling out meritorious claims and fostering
under-deterrence. Our now-familiar PVC factory will cause 5x in social harm to generate a mere x in wealth as long as it can settle related
litigation for less than x. The risk of this outcome increases with each
incremental class member: each new claimant dilutes monitoring and
augments claim diversity at a greater rate than the immediately preceding claimant.
Third, class actions can drain certain judicial resources. Although
aggregate litigation promises efficiencies, it can also be burdensome
on the courts—class actions demand considerable time and decisional
power, straining a court’s ability to promptly resolve other cases
before it.47 This cost, which class actions impose on society as a
whole,48 also increases with each incremental class member. It is more
likely that class members comprising the initial nucleus of the class
action—those with very strong claims for significant damages—would
have sought judicial relief in individual proceedings than each incremental class member, who likely would not demand the judiciary’s
attention but for their inclusion in a class.49 From the perspective of
judicial efficiency, these claims are more cost than benefit.
These three increasing marginal social costs yield the following costbenefit relationship, where n is the socially optimal class size:

Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 1390 (“the defendant and the class counsel have a joint
incentive to negotiate a settlement that gives the class counsel a generous attorney’s fee, but
gives the class members less than the fair value of their claims”).
47. See Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing “the strain
[class] litigation imposes upon already scarce judicial resources”); Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep’t
of Corr., 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1455 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussing “the extraordinary amount of judicial and private resources consumed by massive class action litigation”).
48. Cf. New York State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Gen. Motors Co., 315 F.R.D. 226, 241 (E.D.
Mich. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Marro v. New York State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. No. 16-1821, 2017 WL
6398014 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017) (“there is a strong public interest in encouraging settlement of
complex litigation and class action suits because they are notoriously difficult and unpredictable
and settlement conserves judicial resources”).
49. See supra note 38.
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FIGURE 4: Marginal Social Costs and Benefits of Class Size

As with counsels’ cost-benefit analysis, society’s optimal class size
lies where the marginal cost and benefit curves intersect. Beyond this
point, n, the incremental class member imposes greater costs on society than it offers benefits in return.
3. Private vs. Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
The foregoing cost-benefit analyses are facially similar—both yield
increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits—but their
inputs bear little overlap. This discrepancy explains why counsel often
proffers larger classes than courts prefer to certify: the marginal benefits of class size fall at a slower rate from counsel’s perspective than
they do from society’s perspective. Importantly, counsel benefits when
society benefits—class litigators, like everyone else, are better off
when would-be bad actors are deterred. But society does not capture
counsels’ private benefit in the form of fees. Accordingly, counsels’
marginal private benefit curve outpaces courts’ marginal social benefit
curve:
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FIGURE 5: Comparative Marginal Private and Social Benefits
of Class Size

Similarly, the marginal costs of class size increase at a greater rate
from society’s perspective than they do from counsels’ perspective.
Both shoulder the burden of litigating increasingly remote and hardto-prove claims, but class counsel does not share in the agency costs
from which it is, instead, a direct beneficiary. As a result, the judiciary’s marginal cost curve systematically outpaces counsels’ marginal
cost curve:
FIGURE 6: Comparative Marginal Private and Social
Costs of Class Size
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Overlaying these utility curves yields the following relationship between counsels’ optimal class size (N) and the judiciary’s optimal class
size (n):
FIGURE 7: Private (N) and Social (n) Optimal Class Size

The resultant gap in optimal class size is often even wider in the context of statutory damages, where marginal private benefits do not
decrease:
FIGURE 8: Private (N) and Social (n) Optimal Class Size
(Statutory Damages)
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This helps explain why, from the judiciary’s perspective, class size is
often particularly exaggerated in the context of class seeking statutory
damages. Although other factors are at play, counsels’ static marginal
benefit is part of the story.
In any event, counsels’ preferred class size is typically greater than
the judiciary’s optimum. Of course, courts frequently agree to certify
even very large class actions—suggesting some rough alignment between counsels’ preference and the reviewing court’s optimal class
size—just as they occasionally decline to certify classes that are too
small.50 But experience confirms the foregoing graphical delta—the
gulf between N and n in Figures 7 and 8—as a general proposition.
One need not comb the federal reporters or scholarly annals to locate
critiques of class counsel as interested primarily in accruing greater
fees by amassing enormous classes at the expense of absent class
members.51 Regardless of whether this is in fact the case, courts act as
though it is with sufficient frequency to merit an investigation into
how they respond.
B. Command-and-Control Regulation
Courts regulate class size using a variety of tools within Rule 23 that
can cap class size at the judiciary’s optimum. This Section considers
three: the Rule 23(a) commonality prerequisite,52 and the Rule
23(b)(3) predominance and superiority requirements.53 Each provision affords courts the opportunity to tighten certification standards
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1); see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 330 (1980); Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The
Supreme Court has held fifteen is too small.”).
51. See, e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2014) (declining to approve
class settlement and observing that “[u]nheeded was our warning that because class actions are
rife with potential conflicts of interest between class counsel and class members, district judges
presiding over such actions are expected to give careful scrutiny to the terms of proposed settlements in order to make sure that class counsel are behaving as honest fiduciaries for the class as
a whole” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1170 (2009) (“When self-interested class representatives and selfinterested class counsel seek class status, however, their interests are not the interests that society hopes to vindicate through the (b)(3) class action. The class representative seeks to maximize
the value of the claim, and class counsel seeks to maximize the value of the fee. Neither the
representative nor the counsel has the goal of achieving optimal deterrence or reducing litigation
costs as such.”).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (conditioning certification on the presence of “questions of law or
fact common to the class”).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (providing for certification of damages class only where “the
questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members”).
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through doctrinal pronouncements that—directly or indirectly—target class size by setting rough certification limits:
FIGURE 9: Regulating Class Size

In Figure 9, the court tethers the certification limit to its assessment
of the socially optimal class size (n). It denies certification to classes
that exceed this threshold, e.g., counsels’ preferred class size in this
stylized example (N), on commonality, predominance, or superiority
grounds. Counsel is therefore required to seek certification on behalf
of a smaller class (less than or equal to n) or abandon the effort altogether. Courts achieve this result by tightening the commonality, predominance, and superiority standards, pulling—or even setting—the
certification limit closer to n (and away from N).
1. Commonality
Rule 23(a) limits certification to class actions that raise “questions
of law or fact common to the class.”54 Without teeth, nearly every
class action would satisfy a weak-form of commonality merely by raising the common question of whether the defendant caused each class
member’s alleged injury.55 But contemporary jurisprudence of course
gives commonality more bite. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes56 the
54.
55.
raises
56.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
See Nagareda, supra note 4, at 131–32 (“Any competently crafted class complaint literally
common ‘questions.’ ”).
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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Supreme Court gave that bite force, instructing that commonality requires a “common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of
the claims in one stroke.”57 Therefore, under Wal-Mart, what matters
is not raising common questions, but positing questions capable of
generating common answers central to the litigation.58
Although not explicit, much of Wal-Mart can be read as a rebuke of
class size. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, opened with a
commentary on the sprawling scope of the multi-million-member
class.59 This echoed Judge Sandra S. Ikuta’s concern—expressed in
her dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the certification
order below—that the Wal-Mart class was uncommonly big.60 This
background concern might shed light on why the Wal-Mart majority
began with Rule 23(a)—or even addressed it at all61—given the
Court’s unanimous agreement that the class independently failed on
Rule 23(b)(2) grounds.62 Only the commonality holding allowed the
majority to tighten certification standards for large class actions to
come.63
In any event, and regardless of the Court’s motives, Wal-Mart raises
the commonality bar for large class actions in particular. As a class
grows, the common questions that ostensibly unite its members are
57. Id. at 350.
58. Id. (“What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even
in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt
to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have
the potential to impede the generation of common answers.”).
59. Id. at 342 (“We are presented with one of the most expansive class actions ever.”).
60. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting),
rev’d, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (“No court has ever certified a class
like this one, until now. And with good reason. In this case, six women who have worked in
thirteen of Wal–Mart’s 3,400 stores seek to represent every woman who has worked in those
stores over the course of the last decade—a class estimated in 2001 to include more than 1.5
million women.”).
61. See Klonoff, supra note 19, at 774 (noting that “the Court’s resolution of the (b)(2) issue
made it unnecessary for the Court to consider commonality”).
62. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367–68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(“The class in this case, I agree with the Court, should not have been certified under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The plaintiffs, alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., seek monetary relief that is not merely incidental to any injunctive or
declaratory relief that might be available.”).
63. Klonoff, supra note 19, at 775 (“Thus, under the Dukes formulation, it is not enough that
the question is common; rather, the question must be essential to the outcome of the case.”); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93
B.U. L. REV. 441, 463 (2013) (“Prior to Dukes, federal courts had embraced a view of commonality . . . seen as easy to satisfy, with the necessary showing begin characterized as ‘minimal’ and
permissively construed.”).
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less likely to “be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution” so that “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”64
As the Court recognized, more claimants means more variety—both
with respect to the nature of the injury alleged and individualized defenses, among other things.65 Punishing variety by tightening commonality incentivizes counsel to craft smaller class actions or risk
sacrificing certification altogether.
2. Predominance
Similarly, the Court has raised the hurdle for finding “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.”66 In Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend the Supreme Court advised that “Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a)” and the
“rigorous analysis” inherent to the commonality inquiry.67 Once
again, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, expressly acknowledged
the size of the multi-million-member class.68 And, as commentators
and courts remarked in the wake of Comcast, the Court appears to
have gone out of its way to avoid deciding the predominance issue on
narrow antitrust grounds.69
Indeed, it appears that whether to certify the Comcast class—which
alleged that the defendant cable provider had engaged in anticompetitive clustering of network assets in violation of federal antitrust
law70—could have been decided on the ground that the class had
64. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
65. Id. at 349–50 (“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members
have suffered the same injury. This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation
of the same provision of law. Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways—by intentional discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in disparate impact, and by
the use of these practices on the part of many different superiors in a single company. Quite
obviously, the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII
injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims
can productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for
example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
67. 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013).
68. Id. at 29 (“The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved certification of a class of
more than 2 million current and former Comcast subscribers who seek damages for alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws.”).
69. See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that
Comcast did not affect certification of a consumer class action and distinguishing the Court’s
holding on the ground that “Comcast was an antitrust suit”).
70. Comcast, 569 U.S. at 29–30.
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failed to establish common antitrust injury.71 Picking up on this point,
the dissent approached the case as one that turned on basic principles
of antitrust law, not class action doctrine.72 The majority, however,
came close to holding that individualized damages issues preclude
class certification in all instances, antitrust or not.73 Although several
courts have since cabined Comcast to the antitrust context,74 others
have credited it as tightening predominance across the board.75
71. The Court need not have opined on predominance generally in order to reach its preferred
disposition. Traditionally, predominance entails a two-step inquiry: first, the court must “characterize the issues in the case as common or individual”; second, the court must “weigh which
[issues] predominate.” 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50. This process entails scrutinizing
the plaintiffs’ causes of action to determine whether the common issues are likely to
predominate at trial. See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1412–13 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For
example, in the context of a class action alleging fraud, the reliance element typically predominates. 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:58 (collecting cases). In the antitrust context, antitrust
injury—whether the alleged antitrust violation in fact caused the alleged injury, see Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)—typically predominates. See, e.g., In re
New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (“In antitrust
class actions, common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the fact of
antitrust impact cannot be established through common proof.”); Messner v. Northshore Univ.
HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2012); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d
309, 328 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court therefore could have limited Comcast to the antitrust context—holding, for instance, that the plaintiffs failed to produce a common method of establishing antitrust injury across the class, which is fatal because antitrust injury predominates. Instead,
the Court opined on “damages” generally. Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34 (“[Plaintiffs] cannot show
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.”). And, as the dissent observed: “Recognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well-nigh
universal.” Id. at 42 (Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34 (“This case thus turns on the straightforward application of classcertification principles; it provides no occasion for the dissent’s extended discussion of substantive antitrust law.” (internal citation omitted)).
73. Id. at 38 (“In light of the model’s inability to bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra-competitive prices attributable to the deterrence of overbuilding, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers within the Philadelphia cluster as
members of a single class.”).
74. See, e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013); Barbosa v. Cargill
Meat Solutions Corp., 2013 WL 3340939, at *9 n.2 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2013) (“Plaintiffs assert that
Behrend is distinguishable from a wage-and-hour class action case such as this, and is not applicable to the certification of the settlement class at issue here. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that
this case is susceptible to awarding damages on a classwide basis and unlike in Behrend, there is
no damages model that improperly measures a broader pool of damages that conflict with a
more narrowly defined class. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately distinguished Behrend, and its holding does not preclude certification of a settlement class under the circumstances
of this case.”).
75. See, e.g., Smith v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., 2013 WL 1628176, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(declining to certify a non-antitrust class because, after Comcast, “damages must be susceptible
to measurement across the entire class, and individual damage calculations cannot overwhelm
questions common to the class”); Bright v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 190, 202 (D. N.J.
2013); Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 2014 WL 2957453, at *15 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2014); see also In
re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Before
Behrend, the case law was far more accommodating to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”).
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Following Comcast, the predominance requirement affords courts
another mechanism with which to regulate class size. Even more so
than commonality, predominance offers courts a means to regulate
class actions for which defendants might plausibly offer individualized
defenses—a phenomenon more likely as class size increases. True to
form, Comcast is frequently cited in decisions denying certification to
some of the very largest class actions filed to date.76 At a minimum,
Comcast provides courts a regulatory tool to deploy hydraulically in
response to class size. In other words, the Court’s holding is sufficiently ambiguous vis-à-vis individualized damages that it can be strategically deployed where class size raises concerns. As the Seventh
Circuit opined following (and citing) Comcast:
Predominance of issues common to all class members, like the other
requirements for certification of a suit as a class action, goes to the
efficiency of a class action as an alternative to individual suits. If
resolving a common issue will not greatly simplify the litigation to
judgment or settlement of claims of hundreds or thousands of claimants, the complications, the unwieldiness, the delay, and the danger
that class treatment would expose the defendant or defendants to
settlement-enforcement risk are not costs worth incurring.77

Comcast thus affords concerned courts a plausible means to regulate
size for its own sake.
3. Superiority
Finally, courts have long turned to the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority requirement to regulate class size. These efforts are particularly salient
in the context of class actions that seek statutory damages.78 In Ratner
v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., for example, the Southern District of New York confronted a class action claiming statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),79 related to the
76. See, e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge, 725 F.3d at 382 (vacating and remanding order
certifying class of more than 15,000 rail-freight customers for reconsideration in light of Comcast); In re Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124, 133 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (denying
certification to “tens of thousands” of direct purchasers on predominance grounds in light of
Comcast).
77. Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014).
78. See, e.g., Anderson v. Capital One Bank, 224 F.R.D. 444, 453 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (denying
certification where “[t]he potential damages for such a class are wholly out of proportion to the
harm done to any of the class members”); Vasquez-Torres v. McGrath’s Publick Fish House,
Inc., 2007 WL 4812289, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (denying certification to a class with millions of
plaintiffs alleging statutory damages under FACTA for more than $54.14 million); Price v. Lucky
Strike Entm’t, Inc., 2007 WL 4812281 (C.D. Cal. 2007); see also Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t
Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 55 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It may be that the aggregation in a class action of large
numbers of statutory damages claims potentially distorts the purpose of both statutory damages
and class actions.”).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2012).
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defendant’s alleged failure to disclose certain interest rates to its cardholders.80 Each of the 130,000 plaintiffs sought $100—plus fees and
costs—in statutory damages.81 The court declined to certify the class,
reasoning that Rule 23(b)(3) calls for a “pragmatic” assessment of
whether certification would yield an “annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to [the]
defendant.”82
As the Southern District observed in Ratner, the superiority requirement is “broad and open-ended.”83 But, as other courts have
noted, it does not call for the court to deny certification to an otherwise-cohesive class merely because it would devastate the defendant.84
In fact, the requirement appears to call for certification in exactly
these circumstances because aggregation “is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”85
In the case of nominal statutory damages, individual litigation would
either flood the courts or, far more likely, never commence.86 “Rule
23(b)(3) was designed for situations such as this, in which the potential recovery is too slight to support individual suits, but injury is substantial in the aggregate.”87
Nonetheless, Ratner and its progeny have kept pace with the
proliferation of federal statutes including mandatory damage provisions. For example, courts have relied upon superiority to deny certification to putative classes alleging violations of the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA),88 which provides for statutory
80. 54 F.R.D. 412, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 416.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Mere pressure to
settle is not a sufficient reason for a court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class
action suit.”); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding size “alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification”); Bateman v. Am. MultiCinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In the absence of such affirmative steps to
limit liability, we must assume that Congress intended FACTA’s remedial scheme to operate as
it was written. To limit class availability merely on the basis of ‘enormous’ potential liability that
Congress explicitly provided for would subvert congressional intent.”).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
86. See Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The district court
might conclude on remand that the class device is superior, because no rational individual plaintiff would be willing to bear the costs of this lawsuit.”).
87. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (vacating and remanding an order denying certification to a class alleging statutory damages under the FRCA on
superiority grounds).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to . . . any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the
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damages between $100 and $1,000 per plaintiff.89 And courts have
similarly denied certification on superiority grounds to massive classes
alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA),90 which provides for statutory damages of $500 (subject to
trebling) per call.91 For each of TILA, FACTA, and the TCPA, among
others,92 courts deny certification to otherwise-cohesive classes because they risk ruinous liability.93 This is direct regulation of class size:
putative classes fail Rule 23 because the social costs of over-deterrence outweigh the social benefits attendant to certification.
C. The Costs of Regulation
Regulation is not costless. Courts must invest substantial decisional
resources to make even rough approximations of optimal class size. In
particular, accurate regulation requires a reviewing court to obtain information about the costs and benefits of certification, including likely
deterrent outcomes throughout the affected industry or field, effects
on administrative efficiency, and so forth. Therefore, in addition to the
various inquiries that Rule 23 expressly requires—e.g., the internal cohesion of each class,94 the adequacy of counsel,95 the viability of alterfailure [actual damages] or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 [statutory
damages]”).
89. See, e.g., Leysoto v. Mama Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying
certification to a class of 46,000 customers, each alleging between $100 and $1,000 in statutory
damages, because the defendant “would face almost certain insolvency, despite the fact that its
conduct caused no actual damages,” and “[i]t is difficult to ascertain the benefit to potential class
members under the circumstances of this case”).
90. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2012) (“A person or entity may . . . bring . . . an action to recover
for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater . . . . If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly
violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its
discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the
amount available . . . .”).
91. See Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying class
certification in part for want of superiority on the ground that the TCPA “provides for a minimum recovery of $500 for each violation as well as treble damages if the plaintiff can prove
willful or knowing violation,” which “most likely exceeds any actual monetary loss in paper, ink
or lost facsimile time suffered by most plaintiffs in such a case . . . .”).
92. See, e.g., Legge v. Nextel Commc’ns, 2004 WL 5235587, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2004)
(denying certification to a class of 1.5 million plaintiffs alleging statutory damages under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act because, notwithstanding the presence of common questions of law or fact,
“defendants liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered
by the plaintiff”); In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 350–51 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(same, with respect to a putative class seeking to represent 190 million consumers).
93. See, e.g., London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing
grant of certification to class alleging statutory damages under the TILA and observing, albeit in
dicta, that consideration of “economic harm . . . may be required for superiority”).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring commonality).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (governing class counsel).
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natives to class aggregation,96 and more—courts concerned with class
size must also look beyond the confines of the litigation to consider
the dynamic effects of certification on business practices and the federal docket as a whole.
This is a time-consuming and resource-intensive process. Courts will
do their best to accumulate the most information possible and diligently determine optimal class size. But even that diverts judicial attention and resources—however marginal—from other potentially
worthwhile endeavors. The cost of attaining precision thus develops a
feedback loop: the more courts invest in ascertaining optimal class size
to avoid welfare-deteriorating decisional mistakes, the greater the
welfare-deteriorating administrative costs.
Even assuming, perhaps unrealistically, that courts are able to adequately source and accurately process the scores of inputs that determine optimal class size, perfect regulation carries another cost:
deadweight loss. Owing to the uncertainty inherent in regulating by
squishy doctrinal pronouncements—and the inherently risk-accepting
nature of those invested in pursuing class litigation—counsel continue
to proffer larger classes than courts prefer to satisfy, notwithstanding
tightening certification standards.97 Courts have lamented and will
continue to lament class size long after Wal-Mart and Comcast, calling
upon those and other precedents in district court orders denying certification. In this context, regulation is a blunt instrument ill-suited to
precision decision-making. Specifically, even perfect regulation entails
denying certification to thousands or millions of positive-utility plaintiffs tainted by the presence of even one negative-utility claimant.
Imagine, for example, that a court accurately determines that the
optimal size of a putative class with 10,000 plaintiffs is in fact 9,000
plaintiffs. Granting certification would require the court to knowingly
proceed with a sub-optimally large class containing 1,000 negativeutility claims. But denying certification entails sacrificing the vast majority of the class—in this example, 90% of plaintiffs—with positiveutility claims. In either case—the latter more likely than the former
following Wal-Mart, Comcast, and Ratner—society suffers.
II. TAXING CLASS SIZE
Fortunately, Rule 23 offers more than regulation. It also harbors a
handful of tax mechanisms that can, properly deployed, enable courts
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring superiority).
97. There is nothing inherently irrational about this behavior. Class counsel might, for instance, assess that by filing suit on behalf of a larger putative class, there is a greater chance of
obtaining a favorable settlement before the court reaches a decision on certification.
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to precision modulate class size without the deadweight loss of regulation. Taxing the negative externalities of class size compels counsel to
internalize social costs, thereby bending counsels’ marginal cost and
benefit curves—rather than drawing a hard and fast line in the sand:
FIGURE 10: Taxing Class Size

Although counsel prefers a larger class size (N) than the social optimum (n), counsels’ marginal cost and benefit curves are malleable.
Shifting the latter up, or the former down—both illustrated in Figure
10—realigns counsels’ cost and benefit curves, respectively, with the
social optimum.
Proceeding from that observation, this Part makes three moves:
First, Section II.A contends that this is possible; indeed, Rule 23 embeds a unique tax mechanism that can decrease the marginal private
benefit of bigness: a progressive tax on attorneys’ fees, drawn from
Rule 23(h). Second, Section II.B posits that another tax—similarly
available within Rule 23 and not requiring judicial acrobatics—can increase the marginal private cost of bigness: an escalating notice requirement, drawn from Rule 23(c)(2). These initial forays show that
both taxes are textually available and can be as effective at restricting
class size as regulating by commonality, predominance, and superiority doctrines. Finally, Section II.C argues that taxing class size is often
superior to regulation-by-certification because it avoids the deadweight loss of regulation, is information-forcing, and generates “revenue” (or surplus) from the perspective of the class.
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A. Decreasing the Marginal Private Benefit of Bigness
Courts can first align private and social optima by decreasing the
marginal private benefit of size. This is a familiar exercise to the administrative state. For example, taxing by x the over-active PVC factory that generates an extra x in negative externalities deters the
factory’s welfare-reducing behavior by depressing the factory’s marginal benefit of production by an amount equal to the cost of its negative externalities.
Rule 23 supplies mechanisms by which to similarly tax class size.
For instance, Rule 23(h) provides: “In a certified class action, the
court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that
are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”98 As every federal appellate court has recognized, this fee provision affords district
courts considerable flexibility and discretion in both awarding attorneys’ fees and designing fee structures.99 And while the propriety of a
district court’s fee structure is reviewed de novo,100 appellate courts
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
99. See Heien v. Archstone, 837 F.3d 97, 100 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[A] fee determination will be set
aside only if it clearly appears that the trial court ignored a factor deserving significant weight,
relied upon an improper factor, or evaluated all the proper factors (and no improper ones), but
made a serious mistake in weighing them.”); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47
(2d Cir. 2000) (“What constitutes a reasonable fee is properly committed to the sound discretion
of the district court, and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion, such as a mistake
of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding.”) (internal citations omitted)); In re Diet Drugs,
582 F.3d 524, 538 (3rd Cir. 2009); Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 617 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We
review attorneys’ fee awards for abuse of discretion only. That review is ‘sharply circumscribed,’
and a fee award ‘must not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); Strong v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 1998); Gascho v. Glob.
Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In applying the abuse-of-discretion
standard to an award of attorney’s fees, the trial court is entitled to substantial deference because the rationale for the award is predominantly fact-driven.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Rohm & Haas Pension Plan, 658 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2011); Petrovic v.
Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Decisions of the district court regarding
attorney fees in a class action settlement will generally be set aside only upon a showing that the
action amounted to an abuse of discretion.”); Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 967
(9th Cir. 2009) (“We require only that fee awards be reasonable in the circumstances, and our
review is for abuse of discretion. The district court may award fees pursuant to either a lodestar
or a straight percentage of the settlement fund.” (internal citations omitted)); Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs., L.L.C., 616 F.3d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 2010); Faught v. Am. Home
Shield Corp., 616 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The district court has great latitude in formulating attorney’s fees awards subject only to the necessity of explaining its reasoning so that
we can undertake our review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“This limited standard of review is appropriate in view
of the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding
frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.”).
100. See, e.g., Sutton v. Bernard, 504 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We review the district
court’s methodology de novo to determine whether it reflects procedure approved for calculating awards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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have authorized dozens of unique methodologies, from percentage-ofthe-fund awards to lodestar models,101 with varying enhancements
and multipliers in between.102
Rule 23(h)’s flexible language encourages such experimentation.103
Yet few courts have employed a progressive fee structure—and none
expressly to tax class size. But that does not mean the option is not
available. Consider, for example, a fee structure that awards counsel
less for each incremental class member or group of class members
(i.e., brackets of claimants).104 A court might implement this method
by literally counting noses, or by beginning with a percentage-of-thefund model and awarding counsel a dwindling percentage of the fund
by brackets of plaintiffs:
TABLE 1: Progressive Fee Structure

Plaintiff Brackets Sorted by
Recovery Amounts
First Quartile
Second Quartile

Counsels’ Percentage-ofRecovery Award
x
x/1.33x

Third Quartile

x/2x

Fourth Quartile

x/4x

101. See 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:63 (“Courts generally employ one of two methods in determining fee awards in common fund class action cases: the percentage method (which
awards counsel a fee in relation to the benefit achieved for the class) or the lodestar method
(which awards counsel a fee in relation to their hours and hourly billing rates).”).
102. Id. § 15:89 (collecting circuit-level empirical data on multipliers).
103. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s notes to the 2003 adoption (“This subdivision authorizes an award of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees and nontaxable costs. . . . Depending on
the circumstances, courts have approached the determination of what is reasonable in different
ways. In particular, there is some variation among courts about whether in ‘common fund’ cases
the court should use the lodestar or a percentage method of determining what fee is reasonable.
The rule does not attempt to resolve the question whether the lodestar or percentage approach
should be viewed as preferable.”).
104. Instead, courts occasionally “award a lower percentage of the fund to counsel as the size
of the fund increases.” 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:80. This aggregate method is distinct
from the approach advocated here, whereby fees are adjusted on a per-claimant (or group of
claimants) basis. And even this approach “has not been widely adopted” and has “few proponents.” Id.
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In this example, counsel receives the jurisdiction’s typical percentof-the-fund award (x) for the quartile of the class with the largest recovery. This recognizes the high value of these claims, as well as the
greater likelihood that they would have been the subject of individual
litigation. The fee award then progressively declines for each ensuing
quartile, such that counsel ultimately receives only one fourth of the
jurisdiction’s typical percent-of-the-fund award for the final quarter of
the class.105 The tax causes counsels’ marginal private benefit curve to
slope downward at a greater rate, moving it past the courts’ marginal
social benefit curve to yield a smaller class in line with the social
optimum:
FIGURE 11: Taxing the Marginal Private Benefit of Bigness

This progressive fee structure preserves counsels’ incentive to include the highest-value claims in the class—where value is a function
of both merit (lower marginal cost) and damages (higher marginal
105. This is distinct from the so-called “sliding scale” model, which awards counsel a declining
amount as the class grows in size. Id. That approach “can create perverse incentives: if class
counsel receives less of each next dollar that they secure for the class, they may have an incentive to settle when their percentage drops from 25% to 20%, for example, thereby encouraging
quick settlements at sub-optimal levels.” Id.; see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201,
284 n.55 (3rd Cir. 2001) (stating that this approach “has been criticized by respected courts and
commentators, who contend that such a fee scale often gives counsel an incentive to settle cases
too early and too cheaply”). Taxing class size, by contrast, encourages counsel to obtain the
largest amount for every class member because counsel is awarded a full percent-of-the-fund fee
for the highest-value claims. Settling quick at a sub-optimal level would reduce counsels’ expected returns on those claims.
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benefit)—while simultaneously reducing the incentive to populate the
class with low-value, low-merit claims. The progressive tax also combats sweetheart settlements: The tax the tax is operative even after
counsel removes low-value, low-merit claims; counsel is therefore
poised to receive a smaller fee for back-of-the-class, yet net higher
quality (more value and superior merit) claims. In this way, counsel
sells out itself, not just the class, by negotiating a sweetheart settlement for these claims. In short, taxing class size leaves all wheat, no
chaff.
Courts need not tax in every instance—it is unlikely that a putative
class of only 1,000 or even 10,000 plaintiffs would be too big to certify,
even for the most wary of courts. Instead, courts should tax the marginal private benefit of bigness only where size is such a problem that it
would otherwise independently jeopardize certification. Ideal candidates are massive class actions that appear sufficiently cohesive to
merit certification under a lighter-touch approach to commonality and
predominance, but for which the court is rightly concerned about superiority because of blackmail settlements, agency costs, and the like.
Statutory damage class actions, among others, fit the bill.
While this Article principally considers taxing fees, Rule 23 contains
other latent—even if indirect—tax mechanisms. For example, courts
might direct that counsel will receive a share of the common fund for
only some percentage of the class, while the remainder of what would
be awarded in attorneys’ fees will instead be dedicated to cy pres relief
on behalf of the class.106 As with taxing fees, counsel would be less
incentivized to form a massive class action and yet, unlike the regulatory alternative, a cohesive class would not be denied certification at
the outset.
B. Increasing the Marginal Private Cost of Bigness
Courts also can tax class size by increasing the marginal private cost
of the incremental class member. This tax has the same effect on class
size as decreasing marginal private benefits, but it accomplishes that
feat by bending counsels’ cost curve upward, leaving counsels’ benefit
curve untouched. As each incremental class member becomes more
106. Courts occasionally deploy cy pres distribution in the event of unclaimed money from the
settlement fund. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.
2012). The doctrine requires that the unclaimed funds be channeled to a purpose that would
benefit the class as a whole. See In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682
(8th Cir. 2002) (“the unclaimed funds should be distributed for a purpose as near as possible to
the legitimate objectives underlying the lawsuit, the interests of the class members, and the interests of those similarly situated”).
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expensive, on a marginal basis, counsel is less incentivized to expand
the class.
Courts might, for example, deploy Rule 23(c)(2)—which governs
class notice—in response to class size by requiring greater proof of
receipt or response rates as class size increases.107 Like Rule 23(h),
Rule 23(c)(2) uses broad terms that afford reviewing courts considerable discretion: “[T]he court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”108 Courts might vary their interpretation of the phrases “practicable under the circumstances” and “reasonable effort” with class
size.
More specifically, a “notice tax” could entail adopting tiers of scrutiny that modulate with class size. For smaller classes, courts would
afford counsel a greater measure of deference when reviewing the
form of notice, its contents, and response rates.109 For larger classes,
by contrast, courts would require expert submissions or reports validating the merits of notice delivery and verifying the contents thereof,
as well as active monitoring of—and efforts to encourage greater—
response rates amongst the class.110 These measures would increase
counsels’ costs,111 making it more expensive to include remote and
hard-to-identify class members in particular. This tax, in other words,
causes counsels’ marginal private cost curve to slope upward at a
107. See In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“It is well settled that the reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the most significant
factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating
that “the settlement notice must fairly apprise the prospective members of the class of the terms
of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with the
proceedings” (internal quotation marks omitted)) ; In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Litig., 148
F.3d 283, 317 (3d Cir. 1998) (identifying “the reaction of the class to the settlement” as one of
the “appropriate factors to be considered when determining the fairness of a proposed settlement” (quoting Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1975))).
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
109. See, e.g., UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 630 (6th Cir. 2007) (approving a
settlement notice that declined to inform class members of a potential conflict of interest between the settling parties because Rule 23 “does not require the notice to set forth every ground
on which class members might object to the settlement” as long as it contains “the terms of the
proposed settlement so that class members may come to their own conclusions about whether
the settlement serves their interests” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc., Case No 07 CV 1707, at *8
(N.D. Ill. 2012) (ordering “the appointment of an expert in class action notification”); see also 1
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:80 (“The district court has discretion to appoint an expert
in class notification when serious questions about the effectiveness of a notice campaign exist.”).
111. The Supreme Court held in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin that “a plaintiff must initially
bear the cost of notice to the class.” 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). That, of course, reduces the size of
the overall fund from which counsel draws its fees.
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greater rate, better aligning counsels’ preferred class size with the social optimum:
FIGURE 12: Taxing the Marginal Private Cost of Bigness

There are, however, reasons to prefer decreasing the marginal benefit of class size by taxing attorneys’ fees over this notice-centric approach. As an initial matter, it is easier to drag counsels’ benefit curve
past society’s benefit curve by cutting into the fee award than it is to
drag counsels’ cost curve past society’s cost curve by merely making
notice more expensive. Even an exorbitant notice regime would be
unlikely to exceed the social costs of over-deterrence and principalagent problems. Moreover, the notice tax—which does not cut into
counsels’ fee award—might perversely encourage sweetheart settlements by incentivizing counsel to settle quickly before engaging in
successive rounds of notice. Finally, and perhaps most important, taxing fees is far easier to monitor and modulate that the cost of class
notice.
Fortunately, Rule 23 hides other taxes that could, when properly
deployed, increase the marginal private cost of the incremental class
member. One intriguing candidate is ascertainability—an inconsistently recognized, quasi-textual certification requirement that “insists
that a proposed class be defined in ‘objective’ terms and that an ‘administratively feasible’ method exist for identifying individual class
members and ascertaining their class membership.”112 Courts might
112. Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2354 (2015).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL106.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 37

TAXING CLASS SIZE

5-FEB-20

12:02

37

require notably large class actions to demonstrate ascertainability
before certification,113 thereby increasing counsels’ cost of including
incremental claimants in the class. Ascertainability is particularly useful as a size tax precisely because it is atextual, thereby enabling selective deployment only in cases of very large class actions. Enumerated
certification requirements, by contrast, are not so discretionary.114
C. Advantages to Taxation
In the nearly 100 years since Arthur Pigou authored his seminal
work on externalities, The Economics of Welfare,115 scores of economists have posited the advantages of Pigouvian taxes over regulation.116 This Section argues that several of those advantages attend to
taxing class size as an alternative to regulation-by-certification. In particular, taxing class size: (1) avoids the deadweight loss of regulation;
(2) is information-forcing, allowing courts to act with greater precision
at a lower cost; and (3) generates revenue or surplus for the class.
Courts concerned with bigness should, therefore, give serious consideration to taxing, not regulating, class size.
1. Deadweight Loss
As previously mentioned, even perfect regulation entails deadweight loss in this all-or-nothing context. If counsel presents the court
with anything short of the social optimum, then the court must either
certify a class that is too big or deny certification to thousands—perhaps millions—of positive-utility class members. To illustrate, assume
that counsel presents the court with a sub-optimally large class, reflecting both counsels’ incentive to overpopulate large classes and the
difficulty that courts are likely to encounter in quantifying abstract
113. See, e.g., Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Before a
district court may grant a motion for class certification, a plaintiff seeking to represent a proposed class must establish that the proposed class is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010)
(Rule 23 “states that ‘[a] class action may be maintained’ if two conditions are met: The suit must
satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one of the three categories described in subdivision (b). Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b). By its terms this creates a categorical rule entitling a
plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.”).
115. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE §§ 6–7 (4th ed. 1932).
116. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem
of Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S249 (2011) (“The corrective tax has long been
viewed by most economists as a, or the, theoretically preferred remedy for the problem of harmful externalities.”).
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social benefits like deterrence. Together, these factors yield a putative
class that exceeds the court’s preferred size:
FIGURE 13: Judicial Estimation of Optimal Class Size

The shaded area in Figure 13 represents the deadweight loss of regulating in this case. In the foregoing graphic illustration of this example, putative class size (N) exceeds the social optimum (n). By
adhering to its regulatory cap, however, the court denies class treatment to the vast majority of the class offering greater social benefits
than costs (the shaded area in Figure 13 supra).
Perhaps counsel will, over time, respond to regulation by proposing
systematically smaller classes that safely fit within the certification
limit. That is an empirical question beyond the scope of this inquiry,
but recent experience does not suggest counsel is likely to so respond.
Courts have warned against class size for decades. Yet, as Wal-Mart,
Comcast, and a litany of other cases illustrate, counsel continues to
proffer massive class actions.117 This is itself a consequence of regulating by doctrine—an inherently uncertain, case-by-case exercise—and,
in part, a result of forum shopping for favorable certification standards. Clever class counsel will poke and prod the circuits, looking for
a soft spot with comparatively forgiving certification standards. Moreover, even assuming counsel systematically proposed classes within
every court’s certification limit—a dubious proposition at best—the
117. See supra Part I.B.
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result would be sub-optimally small classes that would leave positiveutility claims on the table and without representation.
All of this is to say that regulation by certification is a hatchet. Even
if the court pinpoints the social optimum—another dubious proposition to which this Section will return—regulation inevitably entails
deadweight loss. Taxation, by contrast, is a scalpel. Consider, for example, a fee-award structure that decreases with each incremental
class member. This tax, when properly implemented, avoids the deadweight loss of regulation by preserving class certification for all positive-utility plaintiffs:
FIGURE 14: Regulation Deadweight Loss

The shaded area in Figure 14 represents the size tax. Here, the court
realigns counsels’ initial preferred class size (N) with the social optimum (n) and where the court would place its certification limit were it
in the business of regulation-by-certification. Taxing class size is welfare enhancing because it targets negative externalities—the shaded
triangle in Figure 14 supra—with minimal collateral damage.118
118. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 232 (2012) (“The Pigouvian tax is often regarded
in theory as an effective form of regulation, because, unlike the command-and-control alternative, the Pigouvian tax allows the regulated party to choose whether, how much, and how to
engage in the regulated activity.”).
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2. Information-Forcing
As previously mentioned, regulation is administratively expensive.
Courts must collect and assess complex and difficult-to-process information about the social costs and benefits of marginal class members.
Then they must synthesize that hard-to-come-by information in a
manner that lends itself to forward-looking assessments about how the
regulated or affected industry or field will respond. All of this is a tall
order. This process is even more difficult than is typically the case for
administrative agencies, because courts—unlike, for example, EPA
staff attorneys—receive information from self-interested advocates,
not from first-hand research in the field.
Pigouvian taxes are easier.119 As an initial matter, the court need
only determine the social cost of the incremental class member and
price the size tax accordingly. Regulation, by contrast, requires the
court to ascertain both the social cost and social benefit on a marginal
basis. Moreover, taxing class size is information-forcing. The progressive fee structure, for example, compels counsel to internalize the social cost of its decision to include the marginal plaintiff in the class.
That opens a dynamic information exchange between counsel and the
court: counsel responds to the tax by altering, or not, the class definition; the court can then respond by increasing or decreasing the tax to
achieve its desired class size. This exchange of information—supplied
entirely by counsels’ reaction to the tax—can better lead courts to the
social optimum.
3. Revenue Generation
Finally, like Pigouvian taxes generally, taxing class size is revenue
generating from the perspective of absent class members.120 Size taxes
transfer wealth within the litigation from class counsel to class members—providing the latter more of the surplus. For example, decreasing counsels’ marginal benefit by progressively reducing fee awards
transfers wealth to the plaintiffs, who retain a greater share of any
recovery. This particular tax has the salutary benefit of reinforcing the
principles that underlie Rule 23. A progressive fee structure, like that
119. See Masur & Posner, supra note 24, at 101 (“The problem with cost- benefit analysis is
that the regulator must know both the benefits and the costs of production. By contrast, to set
Pigouvian taxes, the regulator only needs to know the costs. Thus, Pigouvian taxation should
produce fewer errors.”).
120. See Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability, 63
TAX L. REV. 797, 829 (2010) (“The Pigouvian tax reduces the private utility of the parties involved in the market, but produces an offsetting social benefit to the extent the collected revenue is spent on public goods.”).
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considered above, would permit those class members with the smallest
recoveries to keep a greater share of their damages. These are individuals for whom aggregation might be the only means of securing a positive return.121 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
these are precisely the claims that Rule 23 was designed to
vindicate.122
Other size taxes are also revenue generating, even if indirectly so.
Consider a tax that dedicates a portion of counsels’ fees to cy pres
relief if the class exceeds a certain size. This tax benefits not only the
class writ large but also would-be plaintiffs—excluded from the class
because of the tax—owing to the nature of cy pres relief. In Lane v.
Facebook,123 for example, plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf
of “millions” of the website’s users who had allegedly suffered privacy
invasions in violation of state and federal consumer protection law.124
A proposed settlement stipulated that millions of dollars in undistributed funds would be channeled to a consumer advocacy non-profit
dedicated to advancing and policing Internet privacy.125 This effort,
ultimately approved by the Ninth Circuit on appeal, benefitted both
the plaintiffs—Facebook users who allegedly suffered privacy invasions—and the millions of Facebook and Internet users not included
in the class yet at risk of comparable privacy violations.126
121. See supra note 38; see also Hubbard, supra note 21, at 701 (discussing “the so-called
‘negative expected value’ or ‘NEV’ lawsuit—an individual lawsuit for which the plaintiff’s cost of
litigating the claim is greater than her expected recovery”).
122. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (“A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner’s individual stake in the
damages award he seeks is only $70. No competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s
suit proceed as a class action or not at all.”); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may
be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to
pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic
day in court if a class action were not available.”).
123. 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012).
124. See id. at 816–17, 830 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“The defendant, Facebook, has obtained
a judgment that bars claims by millions of people victimized by its conduct.”).
125. Id. at 817–18 (describing the non-profit).
126. Id. at 821 (determining that the “distribution of settlement funds to entities that promote
the causes of online privacy and security will benefit absent class members and further the purposes of the privacy statutes that form the basis for the class-plaintiffs’ lawsuit.”).
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Regulation, by contrast, is revenue-destructive for putative class
members. Indeed, the rational marginal class member—particularly
one with a negative-value claim—should, if given the choice ex ante,
prefer exclusion by taxation to exclusion by non-certification. The
would-be class member will not recover in either scenario, but the latter eliminates any potential deterrence gains that benefit the would-be
claimant as a member of society. Moreover, owing to the nature of
modern commerce, the marginal class member is likely to be included
in future class actions—possibly even as a high-value claimant who
will directly benefit from future revenue generation.
III. OBSTACLES

AND

OBJECTIONS

Although “most economists believe that Pigouvian taxes are the
best means of regulating a wide variety of harms across a wide variety
of contexts,”127 they are uncommon for a reason (or several). The
most frequently cited impediment is political opposition:128 Even
where regulation has the same effect on the general population as taxation—because, for example, prices are passed down to consumers—
taxes can be a political lightning rod.129 Legislators therefore often
delegate regulatory authority to the administrative state, rather than
endorse a tax themselves. This impediment has no bearing in the class
context. The federal judiciary, imbued with all the protections that Article III lifetime tenure affords,130 interprets Rule 23 independent of
political pressure.
But political opposition is not the only reason that the state regulates instead of taxes. There are other obstacles and objections to
Pigouvian taxes, several of which have salience in the class context.
This Part considers three: (1) the practical difficulty of signaling the
tax ex ante; (2) the costly exercise of accurately “pricing” the tax; and
(3) the risk of incentivizing forum-shopping for lower taxes. While
these impediments should not be overlooked, none counsel against
taxing class size as an occasional alternative to regulation-bycertification.
A. Signaling the Tax
Taxing class size works only if counsel is aware of the tax ex ante.
Transparency is necessary to ensure that counsels’ incentives are re127. Masur & Posner, supra note 24, at 137.
128. See id. at 141–43.
129. See generally Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear & Greed in Tax Policy: A
Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 75 (2003).
130. U.S. Const. art. III.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL106.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 43

5-FEB-20

TAXING CLASS SIZE

12:02

43

aligned while it is in the process of defining the class—in other words,
very early in the litigation, and certainly before counsel moves for certification, counsel must be in a position to respond to the tax if it is to
have any prophylactic value. Short of this, counsel will continue to
propose overbroad classes, obviating the purpose of the tax
altogether.
Fortunately, Rule 23 supplies a comprehensive tax regime, including mechanisms by which to alert counsel to the size tax ex ante. Rule
23(g) provides that, when appointing class counsel, courts “may include in the appointing order provisions about the award of attorney’s
fees.”131 In fact, the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 2003 amendments state that this provision “may afford an opportunity for the
court to provide an early framework for an eventual fee award.”132
Rule 23(g) also expressly permits the court to make these decisions
“before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.”133
Rule 23(g) therefore contains a ready framework for setting a fee
structure ex ante via standing order well before certification.134
Indeed, and in the spirit of taxing class size, Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the Seventh Circuit in In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation,
explained that the ex ante approach better mimics market transactions
and aligns counsels’ and class members’ interests:
[A] district court must estimate the terms of the contract that private plaintiffs would have negotiated with their lawyers, had bargaining occurred at the outset of the case (that is, when the risk of
loss still existed). The best time to determine this rate is the beginning of the case, not the end (when hindsight alters the perception
of the suit’s riskiness, and sunk costs make it impossible for the lawyers to walk away if the fee is too low). This is what happens in
actual markets. Individual clients and their lawyers never wait until
after recovery is secured to contract for fees. They strike their bargains before work begins . . . . Timing is more important than the
choice between negotiation and auction, or between percentage and
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(D).
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s notes to the 2003 adoption.
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3).
134. See 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:7 (“[M]any courts establish attorney fee procedures at the outset of the lawsuit, in anticipation of a fee request at the suit’s conclusion. Some
courts also establish substantive fee provisions at the outset of the lawsuit. Such substantive
provisions run the spectrum from a court merely identifying a fee method it will use at the
conclusion of the lawsuit (percentage or lodestar) to a court actually setting the total fee up
front.”); 2 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:24 (“Courts have discretion to apply a sliding
scale approach to substantial fee awards, under which class counsel obtains a decreasing percentage of the higher tiers of recovery (e.g., 30 percent of the first $xyz, 25 percent of the next $xyz,
and 20 percent of additional amounts, etc.). This ensures class counsel recover the principal costs
of litigation from the first tiers of the award, while allowing the class member clients to secure
more of the benefit at the margin.”).
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hourly rates, for all of these systems have their shortcomings. Only
ex ante can bargaining occur in the shadow of the litigation’s uncertainty; only ex ante can the costs and benefits of particular systems
and risk multipliers be assessed intelligently. Before the litigation
occurs, a judge can design a fee structure that emulates the incentives a private client would put in place. At the same time, both
counsel and class members can decide whether it is worthwhile to
proceed with that compensation system in place.135

Signaling a fee structure is thus more than an academic exercise. In
addition to the Seventh Circuit, other courts have issued a variety of
appointment orders establishing a fee structure at the outset of the
class action.136 For example, courts occasionally determine fees ex ante
via “auctions,”137 in which “law firms competing to represent the class
tell the judge how much they will accept, and the judge picks the low
bidder.”138 Although different from the size tax, ex ante auctions operate by similar mechanics: prior to deciding on a motion for class certification, and concurrent with appointing class counsel, the reviewing
court establishes a progressive fee structure by standing order.
This feature of the Rule 23 tax regime turns the critique on its head.
Taxing class size is more likely than regulation-by-certification to
shape counsels’ incentives early in the litigation precisely because it
can be signaled ex ante. Certification standards, by contrast, are
shrouded in hazy doctrine to be applied case-by-case on an as-applied
basis after exhaustive briefing, attempts to distinguish case law, and
oral argument.139 Although counsel can glean information about a district court’s predilections from its prior decisions or controlling prece135. 264 F.3d 712, 718–19 (7th Cir. 2001). But see Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d
43, 53 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that a court “cannot know precisely what fees common fund plaintiffs in an efficient market for legal services would agree to”).
136. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Many district judges
have begun to follow the private model by setting fee schedules at the outset of class litigation—
sometimes by auction, sometimes by negotiation, sometimes for a percentage of recovery, sometimes for a lodestar hourly rate and a multiplier for riskbearing.”); In re Cardinal Health Inc.
Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“So long as lead plaintiff and lead counsel
are of equal bargaining power and they negotiate at arm’s length, an ex-ante agreement can
more accurately reflect the market value of an attorney’s services as applied to the particular
facts of the case.”); see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
FOURTH § 14.211 (2004) (“Judges should consider advising the parties at the outset of the litigation about the method to be used for calculating fees and, if using the percentage method, about
the likely range of percentages.”).
137. See, e.g., In re Iowa Ready-Mix Concrete Antitrust Litig., 768 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D.
Iowa 2011).
138. Silverman v. Motorola Solutions, Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 2013).
139. See Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. A–S Medication Solutions, LLC, 318 F.R.D. 712, 725
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Courts determine whether issues of individualized consent defeat commonality
and predominance in . . . TCPA cases on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the specific evidence available to prove consent.”).
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dent, it will be difficult to determine with any meaningful precision
whether a putative class is too big to satisfy commonality, predominance, and superiority.
B. Setting the Tax
Signaling the tax is one thing; setting it is harder. Critics of
Pigouvian taxes have long drawn attention to the difficulty of pricing
the social cost of negative externalities.140 In this context, courts cannot reliably tax class size if they cannot first accurately quantify the
social cost of the marginal class member.141 And, of course, many of
the foregoing social costs are not subject to ready quantification.142
Over-deterrence is better described as a qualitative concept than a
quantifiable or empirically observable event.
This concern, though well-founded, applies equally to the regulatory alternative. In fact, unlike taxing class size, regulation-by-certification requires quantification of both social costs and benefits to yield
an accurate optimum. And unlike taxation, regulation is unforgiving:
the decision to certify a class, or not, is a one-off, binary proposition
that requires precision. Two distinguishing features of the taxation alternative make the point.
First, taxation “impose[s] a lower informational burden than command-and-control regulation and will generally be easier to implement.”143 The court need only price social costs, not costs and
benefits. Moreover, the court is better positioned to ascertain difficult140. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1269 (1998) (“The difficulty that the
Pigouvian tax presents to the regulator lies hidden in the choice of the optimal tax rate. For the
regulator to arrive at the efficient tax rate, she must first determine what the efficient activity
levels and care levels are. Imagine how the regulator would determine what the optimal
Pigouvian tax rate would be for cigarettes for a given year. It would almost certainly not be
exactly $7.00 per pack. At best, the $7.00 per pack figure represents a very rough approximation
of the average annual external cost of a pack of cigarettes at roughly the current level of production and assuming essentially the current design of cigarettes.”).
141. See Masur & Posner, supra note 24, at 138 (“If the regulator cannot reliably determine
the social cost of an activity, it cannot calculate the optimal Pigouvian tax.”).
142. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1189
(2011) (“measuring deterrence and thus quantifying optimal deterrence is nearly impossible”);
Christine P. Bartholomew, The Failed Superiority Experiment, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1328–29
(2016) (“Strict cost-benefit analyses generate different questions than rough efficiency. Which
variables count, and what trade-offs still align with fairness and justice? Should the judicial resources expended depend on the case’s value? If so, how should value be defined: Do only
monetary judgments count, or should other potential gains, such as information sharing, be included even if harder to quantify? What about tradeoffs in terms of other cases the court cannot
hear during the pendency of the claim? Even if these initial hurdles are cleared, how much
benefit must exceed cost is unclear: Is one cent enough?”).
143. Masur & Posner, supra note 24, at 138.
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to-quantify costs than even-more-difficult-to-quantify benefits. At
least two of the social costs attendant to class size—agency and administrative costs—are well within the courts’ bailiwick. Courts regularly monitor principal-agent relations and adjudicate the propriety of
principals’ behavior as part of corporate, trust, and estate law, to
name a few. And no actor is better positioned to weigh the costs of
judicial efficiency and how class certification might impact the overall
docket than courts themselves. In contrast, deterrence—which affects
both sides of the ledger when weighing the costs and benefits of certification—is more difficult to measure. But at least the defendant can
attest to when it will be over-deterred by ceasing to engage in specific
activities (a cost). Defendants named in very large putative class actions have warned courts, for example, that certification risks bankruptcy and a cessation of all socially beneficial activity. By contrast,
the court has little means of divining the precise social value of netbeneficial deterrence.
Second, taxation can be iterative.144 A district court might initially
determine after reviewing a complaint that a putative class of 100,000
plaintiffs is sufficiently cohesive to provisionally warrant certification,
but also sufficiently large to merit taxation. It therefore issues a Rule
23(g) standing order that establishes a fee schedule awarding counsel
only one-fourth of the typical percent-of-the-fund award for the lowest-damage quartile of the class.145 If counsel is unresponsive, and the
class definition unchanging, the court can hike the tax; alternatively, if
counsel begins to make deeper cuts to the class definition than the
court anticipated, the court can ease the tax burden.
Taxation is thus more flexible than regulation. In fact, some
Pigouvian advocates, recognizing the difficulty of ascertaining the
equilibrium price or social optimum of any activity, have suggested
setting a minimum standard of acceptability—a floor, not dissimilar
from a regulatory ceiling—and structuring taxes to achieve that minimum standard.146 In the class context, for example, a court might sim144. Id. at 101–02 (“Pigouvian taxes are dynamic and technology-forcing in a way that command-and-control regulation, coupled with cost-benefit analysis, can rarely be. Regulators can
only perform a cost-benefit analysis with respect to extant technology, materials, and
processes—a regulator cannot estimate the cost of a technology that has not yet been invented.
Proposed regulation might fail a cost-benefit test based on the state of existing technology,
whereas a Pigouvian tax could give firms incentives to develop new technologies that would
control pollution or other externalities more cheaply.”).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
146. See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
307, 318 (1972) (“There is an alternative approach to the matter that seems perfectly natural. On
issues as important as those we are discussing, given the limited information at our disposal, it is
perfectly reasonable to act on the basis of a set of minimum standards of acceptability. If, say, we
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ply determine as a matter of course that any class exceeding 100,000
members per se warrants a size tax; any figure below that threshold is
acceptable sans tax. Although this approach sacrifices precision, it
would be easier to administer and—in any event—avoid the deadweight loss of the all-or-nothing regulation.147
C. Forum-Shopping for Lower-Taxes
It is exceedingly unlikely that courts would settle on a uniform tax
structure. Nor should they be encouraged to do so; taxing class size
should be reactive to each particular class. But savvy counsel might
prey on this intended discrepancy by bringing class actions before
courts with that have previously imposed lower taxes.148 Once again,
however, this is true of the regulatory alternative. Insofar as counsel
has discretion to file nationwide class actions in one of several federal
circuits,149 there are already powerful incentives to file in forums with
favorable commonality, predominance, and superiority doctrines.150
Forum-shopping is the status quo.
treat the sulphur content of the atmosphere as one of the outputs of the economic system, it is
not unreasonable to select some maximal level of this pollutant that is considered satisfactory
and to seek to determine a tax on the offending inputs or outputs capable of achieving the
chosen standard. This is precisely the approach employed in the formulation of stabilization
policy, where it is decided that an employment rate exceeding w percent and a rate of inflation
exceeding v percent per year are simply unacceptable, and fiscal and monetary measures are
then designed accordingly.”).
147. Id. at 319 (advocating that the minimum-standard approach, “unlike any system of direct
controls, it promises, at least in principle, to achieve decreases in pollution or other types of
damage to the environment at minimum cost to society”).
148. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class
Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998) (“In the class
action context, however, forum shopping takes a different, and more sinister, form. It entails the
ability of class counsel to commence an action in a forum that is most favorable to counsel’s own
(rather than the class members’) interests.”)
149. Controlling, e.g., for personal jurisdiction, venue, and so forth. See, e.g., In re Dental
Supplies Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 4217115, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs’ claim cannot
arise from [defendant’s] sales to New York dentists because [defendant] did not make any sales
to any named plaintiff in New York.”); Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 2015 WL
12658485, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“Specific personal jurisdiction in a class action is based only on
the named plaintiffs and may not be based on allegations about the residency of unnamed putative class members.”); Spiciarich v. Mexican Radio Corp., 2015 WL 4191532, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (“Therefore, the analysis of where a substantial part of the events took place, in a class
action, looks to the events concerning the named plaintiffs’ claims, not all of the class members’
claims.”).
150. See Shrey Sharma, Note, Do the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards on Class Certification
Incentivize Forum Shopping?: A Comparative Analysis of the Second Circuit’s Class Certification
Jurisprudence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 879 (2016); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil
Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 57 (2017) (observing that “forum
shopping for courts hospitable to class actions is also common”).
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Indeed, there is a compelling case to be made that it will be more
difficult to forum shop for lower taxes than for favorable certification
standards. The meaning and scope of commonality, predominance,
and superiority are questions of law enshrined in precedential decisions, often issued by the Supreme Court. By contrast, fee awards—
not to be confused with fee structures—are questions of fact that are
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. The only precedent that
an appellate court can set with respect to taxing class size is whether a
progressive fee structure is appropriate—a question that several
courts have already answered in the affirmative. The particular fees
awarded within that structure, however, are not the subject of precedential decision-making. Courts could not, therefore, predictably impose lower taxes as a matter of law. That makes forum-shopping for
lower taxes a risky proposition—riskier, at least, than forum-shopping
for favorable regulatory treatment.
IV. DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES
This final Part briefly considers some of the doctrinal consequences
that might follow from taxing class size. Importantly, courts should
not tax in a vacuum. Rather, taxing class size affects class procedure
generally and certification standards in particular. Accordingly, Section IV.A discusses the consequences for commonality and predominance doctrine. Because courts need not regulate and tax to restrict
class size, courts that tax can simultaneously loosen the strictures on
commonality and predominance—returning those standards to their
roots in class cohesion. Apart from commonality and predominance,
Section IV.B considers the implications for a burgeoning area of class
action doctrine that has split federal appellate courts: ascertainability.
A. Cabining Commonality and Predominance
Courts need not—and should not—simultaneously regulate and tax.
As the foregoing illustrates, either is up to the task of restricting class
size. Employing both, however, is at best redundant and at worst welfare-reducing. Accordingly, courts concerned with size can tax and
refocus commonality and predominance on class cohesion.151 This approach adheres to the stated purpose of these certification standards,
which call “upon courts to give careful scrutiny to the relation between common and individual questions in a case.”152 Commonality
151. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (“[The] predominance
inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.”).
152. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL106.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 49

5-FEB-20

TAXING CLASS SIZE

12:02

49

and predominance do not, however, call upon courts to prune class
size by means of seeking out “common answers” (Wal-Mart)153 or uniform damages (Comcast).154
Vacating class size from the commonality and predominance inquiries would entail not only revisiting recent submissions to the class action canon, but also reconsidering recent decisions concerning
appellate standards of review. Indeed, the recent tightening of—and
ensuing confusion over155—commonality and predominance might be
explained in part by the deference typically afforded to trial courts’
certification orders. On one hand, “[i]t is widely recognized that the
class certification decision is committed to the discretion of the district
court and is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.”156 Yet
neither Wal-Mart nor Comcast addressed the standard of review on
appeal, much to the ire of the respective dissents.157 Instead, these
opinions were authored in the shadow of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,158 ostensibly an Erie case in
which Justice Scalia wrote for the Court:
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly empowers a federal court “to certify a class in each and every case” where
the Rule’s criteria are met. But that is exactly what Rule 23 does: It
says that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be maintained”(emphasis added)—not “a class action may
be permitted.” (emphasis added) Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do. The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s “may” is discretion
residing in the plaintiff: He may bring his claim in a class action if he
wishes. And like the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 23 automatically applies “in all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts.”159
153. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–52 (2011).
154. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2013).
155. See Andrew J. Trask, The Curious Case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 2016 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 279, 291 (“[A] number of appellate courts have walked back the Court’s pronouncements about predominance where they could, while others have attempted to follow its holdings.
Comcast’s mixed reception was obvious enough that reporters and scholars alike have noticed
the war over predominance. The end result of this ‘chaos on the ground’ has been confusion over
the proper application of the predominance requirement. Given this confusion, class-action
plaintiffs have pushed to certify sprawling classes based on less rigorous predominance requirements. Defendants have pushed back as hard as possible for categorical rules that confine predominance findings to only a few specific cases.”).
156. Hubbard, supra note 21, at 706.
157. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 369–75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Absent an error of law or an
abuse of discretion, an appellate tribunal has no warrant to upset the District Court’s finding of
commonality.”).
158. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
159. Id. at 399–400.
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This holding, the only one to command a majority of the Court in
the fractious case,160 stakes out the position that certification is
mandatory where the Rule 23 prerequisites and requirements are satisfied.161 In other words, trial courts do not have discretion to deny
certification to putative classes that satisfy the commonality and predominance requirements. That, coupled with ostensibly deferential
appellate review, leaves courts concerned with class size little recourse
other than to tighten what it means for those prerequisites and requirements to be satisfied as a matter of law.
Taxing class size presents another way. It encourages district courts
to actively monitor class size pre-certification, separate and apart from
the certification requirements. That, in turn, affords appellate courts
greater latitude to loosen the reigns on commonality and predominance without inviting a deluge of massive class actions. This alternative approach to size management better coheres with the structure
and apparent purpose of Rule 23. Commonality and predominance
were added to Rule 23 to ensure that class actions—vehicles designed
to secure representation for every meritorious claimant, no matter
how small the individual stakes162—do not sacrifice judicial efficiency
along the way.163 These certification requirements accomplish that
task by screening for cohesion: where the class is cohesive, post-certification proceedings are unlikely to mire the court in droves of minitrials.164 These blunt certification standards are ill-suited, however, to
address size. And there is little in Rule 23 itself or the Advisory Committee’s notes to the Rule’s many amendments to suggest that a class
160. See id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
161. Id. at 399–400.
162. See Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 161 (1974); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to the 1946 adoption (“Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote, uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”); FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to the 1966 adoption (“The court is required to find, as a
condition of holding that a class action may be maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common to the class predominate over the questions affecting individual members. It is
only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of the classaction device.”).
164. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624 (reviewing individualized issues undermining “class cohesion”);
Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008) (no class
cohesion “if redressing the class members’ injuries requires time-consuming inquiry into individual circumstances or characteristics of class members or groups of class members”); Gates v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The disparate factual circumstances of
class members may prevent a class from being cohesive . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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can be too big to certify.165 Instead, commonality and predominance
are appropriately focused on the class itself, not the external consequences of certification.
Finally, it is worth observing that cabining commonality and predominance to class cohesion might—paradoxically—bolster the Supreme Court’s conception of those standards. Using these certification
standards to target size provides skeptical lower courts an easy target.
Consider the Seventh Circuit’s description of the Wal-Mart holding:
Wal-Mart holds that if employment discrimination is practiced by
the employing company’s local managers, exercising discretion
granted them by top management (granted them as a matter of necessity, in Wal-Mart’s case, because the company has 1.4 million
U.S. employees), rather than implementing a uniform policy established by top management to govern the local managers, a class action by more than a million current and former employees is
unmanageable; the incidents of discrimination complained of do not
present a common issue that could be resolved efficiently in a single
proceeding.166

In this passage from McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, decided less than
one year after Wal-Mart, the Seventh Circuit expressly attributes concerns regarding the manageability of a million-member class to the
Court’s holding, notwithstanding the absence of such express language
in Wal-Mart itself. And, unsurprisingly, the Seventh Circuit in that
case reversed an order denying certification to a 700-member class
alleging employment discrimination, notwithstanding “an undoubted
resemblance” to the Wal-Mart class denied certification.167 Bringing
the analysis full circle, the court concluded: “Merrill Lynch is in no
danger of being destroyed by a binding class-wide determination that
it has committed disparate impact discrimination against 700 brokers.”168 Thus, at least in this case, one skeptical court was able to
largely confine Wal-Mart to a question of class size—and perhaps
avoid much of its holding accordingly.
165. The closest the Advisory Committee comes to endorsing this kind of cost-benefit analysis
is in the notes to the 1966 Amendments, which state:
To reinforce the point that the court with the aid of the parties ought to assess the
relative advantages of alternative procedures for handling the total controversy, subdivision (b)(3) requires, as a further condition of maintaining the class action, that the
court shall find that that procedure is “superior” to the others in the particular
circumstances.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to the 1966 adoption.
166. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir.
2012).
167. Id. at 489.
168. Id. at 491.
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B. Incentivizing Ascertainability
Remarking on the rise of progressive income taxes at the turn of the
twentieth century, French economist Thomas Piketty observed: “Taxation is not only a way of requiring all citizens to contribute to the
financing of public expenditures and projects and to distribute the tax
burden as fairly as possible; it is also useful for establishing classifications and promoting knowledge as well as democratic transparency.”169 So too here. Taxing class size will all but require counsel
to (1) obtain greater information about the contours of any putative
class and (2) reveal that information to the court in the course of
structuring the class definition to minimize its tax burden. Ignoring the
tax by simply filing a class definition without some sense—perhaps,
even, a very specific sense—of class composition would be dangerous.
Counsel facing a tax can therefore be expected to proffer classes
whose members are more ascertainable, obviating much of the handwringing over whether Rule 23 incorporates an ascertainability
requirement.170
The doctrinal consequences that follow from this shift in focus
should not be underestimated. Many of the consequences will dictate
the choice among several possible tax mechanisms. For example,
courts typically afford counsel considerable discretion in crafting and
distributing settlement notice.171 Taxing class size, by contrast, entails
169. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Éditions de Seuil 2013) (Harvard 2017).
170. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The ascertainability requirement serves several important objectives. First, it eliminates serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class action by insisting
on the easy identification of class members. Second, it protects absent class members by facilitating the best notice practicable under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. Third, it protects
defendants by ensuring that those persons who will be bound by the final judgment are clearly
identifiable.” (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)); Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D.
59, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Class membership must be readily identifiable such that a court can
determine who is in the class and bound by its ruling without engaging in numerous fact-intensive inquiries.”); Rose v. Saginaw Cnty., 232 F.R.D. 267, 271 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“A precise
definition allows the Court to determine who would be entitled to relief, who would be bound by
a judgment, and who is entitled to notice of the action.”); Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet,
Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (“A sufficiently precise class definition enables the court
to weigh whether trying the lawsuit through the class mechanism would be burdensome and
inefficient.”).
171. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“The standard for the adequacy of a settlement notice in a class action under either the Due
Process Clause or the Federal Rules is measured by reasonableness. There are no rigid rules to
determine whether a settlement notice to the class satisfies constitutional or Rule 23(e) requirements; the settlement notice must fairly apprise the prospective members of the class of the
terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with the
proceedings. Notice is adequate if it may be understood by the average class member.” (internal
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clear, ex ante direction and active monitoring upfront.172 And it would
be difficult for the court to monitor class notice and accurately gauge
distribution and response rates if the class is not ascertainable ex ante.
This suggests, at a minimum, that ascertainability factors into courts’
analysis. But, as previously mentioned, ascertainability is a fraught issue; whether counsel must present an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying putative class members before certification is
subject to a burgeoning circuit split.173 Even those courts that have
demanded ascertainability are divided as to whether the atextual requirement springs from the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority requirement,
Rule 23(a)’s reference to “a class,” or somewhere else entirely.174 This
is infirm grounding at best for taxing class size.
Given these difficulties, progressively taxing fees is a likely candidate for adoption. But even this approach calls for greater scrutiny of
the class composition as counsel adjusts the class definition in response to the tax. Again, tradeoffs abound. Whereas the certification
requirements typically operate to screen out flimsy class actions that
do not merit the court’s attention to issues like attorneys’ fees, taxing
class size entails ex ante assessment of attorneys’ fees for the largest
class actions, merit aside.

quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices
Litig., 271 F.R.D. 263, 295 (D. Kan. 2010) (“Regarding notice of class certification, subsection
(c)(2) imposes more stringent requirements than subsection (e) imposes with regard to class
settlement. With respect to a proposed class settlement, subsection (e) requires only that the
Court direct notice ‘in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the
proposal.’ ”).
172. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 536 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Of the
1.8 million potential class members, 136 consumers and ten TPP claimants opted out of the
settlement, and 11 consumers or groups of consumers and two TPP claimants objected to the
proposed settlement. As of June 3, 2002, 48,305 consumer and 1,055 TPP claims had been received and processed by the administrator. The District Court concluded that the insignificant
number of objections filed weighed in favor of approving the settlement. Although we have
previously noted that the district court should be cautious about inferring support from a small
number of objectors in a sophisticated settlement, we agree with the District Court that the small
number of TPP objectors is particularly telling as they are sophisticated businesses with very
large potential claims.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
173. Compare Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2013) (requiring ascertainability), with Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2017)
(dismissing ascertainability as unsupported by the text of Rule 23).
174. Some courts draw support for ascertainability from Rule 23(a)’s reference to “a class.”
See, e.g., Robinson v. Gillespie, 219 F.R.D. 179, 183 (D. Kan. 2003). Some point to the Rule
23(b)(3) superiority requirement. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663–64
(7th Cir. 2015). And others ground the requirement in policy rationale, acknowledging the absence of express textual support in the Rule. See, e.g., In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Litig.,
471 F.3d 24, 30, 33–35 (2d Cir. 2006).
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps courts should not concern themselves with class size. In
that case, taxing class size is a solution in search of a problem. But
time and again, through an array of different standards and doctrines,
courts appear to deny certification to massive classes because they are
massive. Setting aside the normative merits of this endeavor, certification-by-regulation is not the only path. Instead, Rule 23 supplies the
courts with a handful of tax mechanisms that can not only restrict class
size, but also avoid the deadweight loss of denying certification to otherwise cohesive classes. Courts concerned with class size should actively pursue this alternative to the inflexible certification-byregulation alternative.

